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ABSTRACT
Besides the better-known Nelson logic (N3) and paraconsistent Nelson logic (N4), in 1959 David
Nelson introduced, with motivations of realizability and constructibility, a logic called S. The logic
S was originally presented by means of a calculus (crucially lacking the contraction rule) with in-
finitely many rule schemata and no semantics (other than the intended interpretation into Arithmetic).
We look here at the propositional fragment of S, showing that it is algebraizable (in fact, implica-
tive), in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, with respect to a variety of three-potent involutive residuated
lattices. We thus introduce the first known algebraic semantics for S as well as a finite Hilbert-style
calculus equivalent to Nelson’s presentation; this also allows us to clarify the relation between S and
the other two Nelson logicsN3 andN4.
Keywords Nelson’s logics, Constructive logics, Strong negation, Paraconsistent Nelson logic, Substructural logics,
Three-potent residuated lattices, Algebraic logic.
1 Introduction
In the course of his extensive investigations into the notion of ‘constructible falsity’, David Nelson introduced a number
of systems of non-classical logics that have aroused considerable interest in the logic and algebraic logic community
(see, e.g., [25] and the references cited therein). Over the years, the main goal of Nelson’s enterprise was to provide
logical formalisms that allow for more fine-grained analyses of notions such as ‘falsity’ and ‘negation’ than either
classical or intuitionistic logic can afford.
Nelson’s analysis of the meaning of ‘falsity’ is in many ways analogous to the intuitionistic analysis of ‘truth’. The
main property advocated by Nelson— namely, if a formula¬(φ∧ψ) is provable, then either¬φ or¬ψ is provable— is
one that may be regarded as a dual to the well-known disjunction property of intuitionistic logic. In later investigations,
just as the intuitionists argued against the usual object language formulation of the principle of excluded middle,
φ∨¬φ, so Nelson was led to introduce logical systems that reject certain object language formulations of the principle
of explosion (ex contradictione quodlibet). The resulting logics thus combine an intuitionistic approach to truth with
a dual-intuitionistic treatment of falsity, not unlike the one of the so-called bi-intuitionistic logic [28, 29].
The systems in the family nowadays known as Nelson’s logics share many properties with the positive fragment of
intuitionistic logic (in particular, they do not validate Peirce’s law ((φ⇒ ψ)⇒ φ)⇒ φ). They also possess a negation
connective with inconsistency-tolerant features, in the sense that formulas such as (φ ∧ ¬φ)⇒ ψ need not be valid.
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The oldest and most well-known of Nelson’s systems was introduced in [23] and is today known simply as Nelson
logic (following [25], we shall denote it by N3). This logic is by now well understood from a proof-theoretic (see,
e.g., [21]) as well as an algebraic point of view [37, 38], both perspectives allowing us to regardN3 as a substructural
logic in the sense of [16].
Paraconsistent Nelson logic N4 is a weakening of N3 introduced in [4] (also independently considered in [19] and
[34]) as, precisely, a non-explosive version of N3 suited for dealing with inexact predicates. Our understanding of
the proof-theoretic as well as the algebraic properties of N4 is more recent and still not thorough. However, thanks
to recent results of M. Spinks and R. Veroff, N4 can now be viewed as a member of the family of relevance logics;
indeed,N4 can be presented, to within definitional equivalence, as an axiomatic strengthening of the contraction-free
relevant logicRW (see [39] for a summary of this work).
Thanks mainly to the works of S. Odintsov (see e.g. [25], although the result has been formally stated for the first
time only in [31]), we also know that N4 (like N3) is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi. This means
that the consequence relation of N4 can be completely characterized in terms of the equational consequence of the
corresponding algebraic semantics, which consists in a variety of algebras called N4-lattices.
For our purposes, these algebraic completeness results entail in particular that we can compare both N3 and N4 to
the logic S — the main object of the present paper — by looking at the corresponding classes of algebras. Before we
turn our attention to S, let us dwell on another remarkable feature shared byN3 and N4.
For the propositional part (on which we shall exclusively focus in this paper), the language of both N3 and N4
comprises a conjunction (∧), a disjunction (∨), a so-called ‘strong’ negation (¬) and two implications: a so-called
‘weak’ (→) and a ‘strong’ one (⇒), usually introduced via the following term: φ ⇒ ψ := (φ → ψ) ∧ (¬ψ → ¬φ).
The presence of two implications is crucial in Nelson’s logics: it is this feature that makes, one may argue, the Nelson
formalism more fine-grained than classical or intuitionistic logic (or most many-valued logics, for that matter). With
the two Nelson implications at hand, one is able to register finer shades of logical discrimination than it is possible in
logics that are more ‘classically’ oriented in nature (see Humberstone [18] for a general discussion of this issue).
In fact, different classical or intuitionistic tautologies may be proved within Nelson’s logics using either → or ⇒,
creating a non-trivial interplay between these two implications and with the negation connective; the strong implication
exhibits an inconsistency-tolerant behaviour, in that (p ∧ ¬p) ⇒ q is not provable, while the other retains a more
‘classical’ flavour, in that (p ∧ ¬p) → q turns out to be provable. On the other hand, while the weak implication
(→) allows us to see N3 and N4 as conservative expansions of positive intuitionistic logic by a negation connective
with certain classical features (De Morgan, involutive laws), the strong implication (⇒) permits us to view their
algebraic counterparts as residuated structures, and therefore to regard N3 and N4 as strengthenings (as a matter of
fact, axiomatic ones) of well-known substructural or relevance logics.
We note, in passing, that the overall picture is mademore interesting and complex by the fact that other meaningful non-
primitive connectives can be defined — for example, an ‘intuitionistic’ negation (distinct from the primitive ‘strong’
negation ¬) given by φ→ 0, or a ‘multiplicative’ monoidal conjunction given by ¬(φ⇒ ¬ψ) — and by the fact that
interdefinability results hold even among the primitive connectives (some of these being highly non-trivial to prove).
We shall not enter into further details concerning this issue for this is not the main focus of the present paper; instead,
we will now turn our attention to the logic S, which has so far remained least well-known among the members of the
Nelson family.
The logic that we (following Nelson’s original terminology) call S was introduced in [24] with essentially the same
motivations as N3: that is, as a more flexible tool for the analysis of falsity, and in particular as an alternative to
both N3 and intuitionistic logic for interpreting Arithmetic through realizability. The propositional language of S
comprises a conjunction, a disjunction, a falsity constant and (just one) implication. Whether this implication ought
to be regarded as a ‘strong’ or a ‘weak’ one will become apparent as a result of the investigations in the present paper.
Nelson’s presentation of S is given by means of a calculus that appears peculiar, to the modern eye, in several respects.
It may look like a sequent calculus, but it is not. One could say that it is in fact a Hilbert-style calculus, though one
with few axioms and many rules — infinitely many, in fact: not just instances, but infinitely many rule schemata. No
standard semantics is provided in [24] for the calculus other than the intended interpretation of its (first-order) formulas
as arithmetic predicates.
The above features may in part explain why S has received, to the present day, very little attention in comparison to
the other two Nelson’s logics: to the point that, to the best of our knowledge, even the most basic questions about
S had not yet been asked, let alone answered. One could start by asking, for example, whether S does admit a
finite axiomatization. Another basic issue, which is interestingly obscured by Nelson’s presentations of S and N3
in [24], is whether one of these two logics is stronger than the other or else whether they are incomparable. Last
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but not least, Nelson observes that certain formulas are not provable in his system [24, p. 213]. In the absence of a
complete semantics for S, it does not seem obvious how one could prove such claims. Having established our algebraic
completeness result, however, this will become quite straightforward.
The main motivation for the present paper has been to look at the above questions and, more generally — taking
advantage of the modern tools of algebraic logic — to gain a better insight into (the propositional part of) S and into
its relation to other well-known non-classical logics. As we shall see in the following sections, we have successfully
settled all the above-mentioned issues, and the corresponding answers can be summarized as follows.
First of all, S may indeed be axiomatized by means of a finite Hilbert-style calculus (having modus ponens as its
only rule schema) which is a strengthening of the contraction-free fragment of intuitionistic logic and also of the
substructural logic known as the Full Lambek Calculus with Exchange and Weakening (FLew). This follows from
our main result that S is Blok-Pigozzi algebraizable (and therefore, enjoys a strong completeness theorem)with respect
to a certain class of residuated lattices, which are the canonical algebras associated with substructural logics stronger
than FLew. Furthermore, we may now say that the implication of S is indeed a ‘strong’ Nelson implication in the
sense that it can be meaningfully compared with the corresponding strong implications of N3 and N4. From this
vantage point, we will see that Nelson’s logicN3 may be regarded as an axiomatic strengthening of S, whereasN4 is
incomparable with S. And finally we will confirm that Nelson was correct in claiming that the formulas listed in [24,
p. 213] are actually not provable in S.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the logic S through Nelson’s original presentation (duly
amending a number of obvious typos) and employ it to prove a few formulas that will be useful in the following
sections. In Section 3 we prove that Nelson’s calculus is algebraizable, and provide an axiomatization of the cor-
responding class of algebras, which we call S-algebras (Subsection 3.1). Because of the above-mentioned peculiar
features of Nelson’s calculus, the presentation of S-algebras obtained algorithmically via the algebraization process is
not very convenient. We introduce then an alternative equational presentation in Subsection 3.2 and show the equiv-
alence of the two. As a result of our own presentation, we establish that S is a strengthening of FLew . Taking
advantage of this insight, in Section 4 we introduce a finite Hilbert-style calculus for S which is simply an axiomatic
strengthening of a well-known calculus for FLew. Completeness of our axiomatization, and therefore equivalence
with Nelson’s calculus, is obtained as a corollary of the algebraizability results. In Section 5 we look at concrete
S-algebras which provide counter-examples for the formulas Nelson claimed to be unprovable within S. We present
in Subsection 5.2 an easy way of building an S-algebra starting from a residuated lattice, which turns out to be useful
later on (Section 7). Section 6 establishes the relation between S and the two other Nelson’s logics, N3 (Subsection
6.1) and N4 (Subsection 6.2). We show in particular that both N3 and the three-valued Łukasiewicz logic (but no
other logic in the Łukasiewicz family) may be seen as axiomatic strengthenings of S. In Section 7 we use the algebraic
insights gained so far to obtain information on the cardinality of the strengthenings of S. Finally, Section 8 contains
suggestions for future work.
The present paper is an expanded and improved version of [22], to which we shall refer whenever doing so allows us to
omit or shorten our proofs. Let us highlight the main differences and present novelties. From Section 2 to Theorem 4
of Section 4 we follow essentially Sections 2–4 of [22]. The remaining part of Section 4 (dealing with EDPC and
WBSO varieties) is new, as is Section 5. In particular, Subsection 5.1 contains a proof of the claim made in [22] that
the distributivity axiom (as well as the other formulas mentioned in Proposition 4) is not valid in S. The usage of the
Galatos-Raftery doubling construction (in both Section 5 and Section 6) is entirely new. Subsection 6.1 is essentially
an expanded version of Section 5.1 from [22]; on the other hand, the results from Proposition 8 to the end of Section 6
are new. Section 7 is also entirely new.
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2 Nelson’s Logic S
In this section we recall Nelson’s original presentation of the propositional fragment of S, modulo the correction of a
number of typos that appear in [24].
We denote by Fm the formula algebra over a given similarity type, freely generated by a denumerable set of propo-
sitional variables {p, q, r, . . .}. We denote by Fm the carrier of Fm, and use ϕ, ψ and γ, possibly decorated with
subscripts, to refer to arbitrary elements of Fm. A logic is then defined as a substitution-invariant consequence rela-
tion ⊢ on Fm.
Definition 1. Nelson’s logic S := 〈Fm,⊢S〉 is the sentential logic in the language 〈∧,∨,⇒,¬, 0〉 of type 〈2, 2, 2, 1, 0〉
defined by the Hilbert-style calculus with the rule schemata in Table 1 and the following axiom schemata. We shall
henceforth use the abbreviations φ⇔ ψ := (φ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ φ) and 1 := ¬0.
Axioms
(A1) φ⇒ φ
(A2) 0⇒ ψ
(A3) ¬φ⇒ (φ⇒ 0)
(A4) 1
(A5) (φ⇒ ψ)⇔ (¬ψ ⇒ ¬φ)
In Table 1 below, following Nelson’s notation, Γ denotes an arbitrary finite list (φ1, . . . , φn) of formulas, and the
following abbreviations are used:
Γ⇒ φ := φ1 ⇒ (φ2 ⇒ (. . .⇒ (φn ⇒ φ) . . .)).
If Γ is empty, then Γ⇒ φ is just φ. Moreover, we let
φ⇒2 ψ := φ⇒ (φ⇒ ψ)
and
Γ⇒2 φ := φ1 ⇒
2 (φ2 ⇒
2 (. . .⇒2 (φn ⇒
2 φ) . . .)).
Γ⇒ (φ⇒ (ψ ⇒ γ))
Γ⇒ (ψ ⇒ (φ⇒ γ))
(P)
φ⇒ (φ⇒ (φ⇒ γ))
φ⇒ (φ⇒ γ)
(C)
Γ⇒ φ φ⇒ γ
Γ⇒ γ
(E)
Γ⇒ φ ψ ⇒ γ
Γ⇒ ((φ⇒ ψ)⇒ γ)
(⇒ l)
γ
φ⇒ γ
(⇒ r)
φ⇒ γ
(φ ∧ ψ)⇒ γ
(∧l1)
ψ ⇒ γ
(φ ∧ ψ)⇒ γ
(∧l2)
Γ⇒ φ Γ⇒ ψ
Γ⇒ (φ ∧ ψ)
(∧r)
φ⇒ γ ψ ⇒ γ
(φ ∨ ψ)⇒ γ
(∨l1)
φ⇒2 γ ψ ⇒2 γ
(φ ∨ ψ)⇒2 γ
(∨l2)
Γ⇒ φ
Γ⇒ (φ ∨ ψ)
(∨r1)
Γ⇒ ψ
Γ⇒ (φ ∨ ψ)
(∨r2)
(φ ∧ ¬ψ)⇒ γ
¬(φ⇒ ψ)⇒ γ
(¬⇒l)
Γ⇒2 (φ ∧ ¬ψ)
Γ⇒2 ¬(φ⇒ ψ)
(¬⇒r)
(¬φ ∨ ¬ψ)⇒ γ
¬(φ ∧ ψ)⇒ γ
(¬∧l)
Γ⇒ (¬φ ∨ ¬ψ)
Γ⇒ ¬(φ ∧ ψ)
(¬∧r)
(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)⇒ γ
¬(φ ∨ ψ)⇒ γ
(¬∨l)
Γ⇒ (¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
Γ⇒ ¬(φ ∨ ψ)
(¬∨r)
φ⇒ γ
¬¬φ⇒ γ
(¬¬l)
Γ⇒ φ
Γ⇒ ¬¬φ
(¬¬r)
Table 1: Rules of S
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We have fixed obvious typos in the rules (∧l2), (∧r) and (¬⇒r) as they appear in [24, p. 214-5]. For example, rule
(¬⇒r) from Nelson’s paper reads as:
Γ⇒2 ¬(φ⇒ ψ)
Γ⇒2 (φ ∧ ψ)
This is not even classically valid. One might consider correcting the rule as follows:
Γ⇒2 ¬(φ⇒ ψ)
Γ⇒2 (φ ∧ ¬ψ)
but this does not seem consistent with the convention used by Nelson for the other rules: the ⇒ connective should
appear on the right-hand side at the bottom, and ∧ at the top. We assume thus that this corrected version was intended
to have been written upside-down. The rule (C), calledweak condensation by Nelson, replaces (and is indeed a weaker
form of) the contraction rule:
φ⇒ (φ⇒ ψ)
φ⇒ ψ
This rule is also known in the literature as ‘3-2 contraction’ [30, p. 389] and corresponds, on algebraic models, to the
property of three-potency (see Section 3.2). Notice also that the usual rule of modus ponens (from φ and φ⇒ ψ, infer
ψ) is an instance of (E) for Γ = ∅. Lastly, let us highlight that every rule schema involving Γ is actually a shorthand
for a denumerably infinite set of rule schemata. For instance, the schema:
Γ⇒ φ ψ ⇒ γ
Γ⇒ ((φ⇒ ψ)⇒ γ)
(⇒ l)
stands for the following collection of rule schemata:
φ ψ ⇒ γ
(φ⇒ ψ)⇒ γ
γ1 ⇒ φ ψ ⇒ γ
γ1 ⇒ ((φ⇒ ψ)⇒ γ)
· · ·
γ1 ⇒ (γ2 ⇒ (γ3 ⇒ φ)) ψ ⇒ γ
γ1 ⇒ (γ2 ⇒ (γ3 ⇒ ((φ⇒ ψ)⇒ γ)))
· · ·
Thus, Nelson’s calculus employs not just infinitely many axiom and rule instances, but actually infinitely many rule
schemata. Notice, nonetheless, that defining as usual a derivation as a finite sequence of formulas, we have that the
consequence relation of S is finitary.
3 Algebraic semantics
In this section we show that S is algebraizable (and, in fact, is implicative in Rasiowa’s sense [15, Definition 2.3]),
and we give two equivalent presentations for its equivalent algebraic semantics (that we shall call S-algebras). The
first presentation is obtained via the algorithm of [7, Theorem 2.17], while the second one is closer to the usual
axiomatizations of classes of residuated lattices, which constitute the algebraic counterparts of many logics in the
substructural family. In fact, the latter presentation of S-algebras will allow us to see at a glance that they form
an equational class, and will also make it easier to compare them with other known classes of algebras related to
substructural logics.
Following standard usage, we denote byA (in boldface) an algebra and byA (italics) its carrier set. Given the formula
algebra Fm, the associated set of equations, Fm× Fm, will henceforth be denoted by Eq. To say that 〈φ, ψ〉 ∈ Eq,
we will write φ ≈ ψ, as usual. We say that a valuation ν : Fm→ A satisfies φ ≈ ψ inA when ν(φ) = ν(ψ). We say
that an algebraA satisfies φ ≈ ψ when all valuations overA satisfy it.
It will be convenient for us to work with the following definition of algebraizable logic, which is not the original
one [7, Definition 2.1] but an equivalent so-called intrinsic characterization [7, Theorem 3.21] of it:
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Definition 2. A logic L is algebraizable if and only if there are equations E(x) ⊆ Eq and formulas ∆(x, y) ⊆ Fm
such that:
(R) ∅ ⊢L ∆(φ, φ)
(Sym) ∆(φ, ψ) ⊢L ∆(ψ, φ)
(Trans) ∆(φ, ψ) ∪∆(ψ, γ) ⊢L ∆(φ, γ)
(Rep)
⋃n
i=1
∆(φi, ψi) ⊢L ∆(•(φ1, . . . , φn), •(ψ1, . . . , ψn)),
for each n-ary connective •
(Alg3) φ ⊣⊢L ∆(E(φ))
Here, the notation Γ ⊢ ∆, where∆ is a set of formulas, means that Γ ⊢ φ for each φ ∈ ∆. The set E(x) is said to be
the set of defining equations and ∆(x, y) is said to be the set of equivalence formulas. We say that L is implicative
when it is algebraizable with E(x) := {x ≈ α(x, x)} and ∆(x, y) := {α(x, y), α(y, x)}, where α(x, y) denotes a
binary term in the language of L. In such a case, the term α(x, x) determines an algebraic constant on every algebra
belonging to the algebraic counterpart of L (see [15, Lemma 2.6]), and is usually denoted accordingly.
Theorem 1 ([22], Theorem 1). The logic S is implicative, and thus algebraizable, with defining equation E(x) :=
{x ≈ 1}— or, equivalently, E(x) := {x ≈ x⇒ x}— and equivalence formulas∆(x, y) := {x⇒ y, y ⇒ x}.
3.1 S-algebras
By Blok and Pigozzi’s algorithm ([7, Theorem 2.17]; see also [14, Theorem 30], [15, Proposition 3.44]), the equivalent
algebraic semantics of S is the quasivariety of algebras [10, Definition V.2.24] given by the following definition:
Definition 3. An S-algebra is a structureA := 〈A,∧,∨,⇒,¬, 0, 1〉 of type 〈2, 2, 2, 1, 0, 0〉 that satisfies the following
equations and quasiequations:
1. For each axiom ϕ of S, the equation E(ϕ) defined as E(ϕ) := ϕ ≈ 1.
2. x⇒ x ≈ 1.
3. For each rule
ϕ1 · · · ϕn
φ
(R)
of S, the quasiequation Q(R) defined as follows:
Q(R) := [ϕ1 ≈ 1 & . . . & ϕn ≈ 1] =⇒ φ ≈ 1.
4. [x⇒ y ≈ 1 & y ⇒ x ≈ 1] =⇒ x ≈ y.
We shall henceforth denote by E(An) the equation given in Definition 3.1 for the axiom An (for 1 ≤ n ≤ 5) of S, and
by Q(R) the quasiequation given in Definition 3.3 for the rule R of S. We will also use the following abbreviations:
a ∗ b := ¬(a ⇒ ¬b), a2 := a ∗ a and an := a ∗ (an−1) for n > 2. As the notation suggests, the defined
connective ∗ may be regarded as a ‘multiplicative conjunction’ in the sense of substructural logics. On S-algebras,
the operation ∗ will be interpreted as a monoid operation having the implication (⇒) as its residuum, whereas the
‘additive conjunction’∧ will be interpreted as the meet of the underlying lattice structure. We list next a few properties
of S-algebras that will help us in viewing them, later on, as a class of residuated structures:
Proposition 1 ([22], Proposition 3). LetA := 〈A,∧,∨,⇒,¬, 0, 1〉 be an S-algebra and a, b, c ∈ A. Then:
1. 〈A,∧,∨, 0, 1〉 is a bounded lattice whose order ≤ is given by a ≤ b iff a⇒ b = 1.
2. 〈A, ∗, 1〉 is a commutative monoid.
3. The pair (∗,⇒) is residuated with respect to ≤, i.e., a ∗ b ≤ c iff a ≤ b⇒ c.
4. a⇒ b = ¬b⇒ ¬a.
5. a⇒ 0 = ¬a and ¬¬a = a.
6. a2 ≤ a3.
7. (a ∨ b)2 ≤ a2 ∨ b2.
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3.2 S-algebras as residuated lattices
In this section we introduce an equivalent presentation of S-algebras which takes precisely the properties in Proposition
1 as postulates. We begin by recalling the following well-known definitions (see e.g. [16, p. 185]):
Definition 4. A commutative integral residuated lattice (CIRL) is an algebra A := 〈A,∧,∨, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 of type
〈2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0〉 such that:
1. 〈A,∧,∨〉 is a lattice (with ordering ≤) with maximum element 1.
2. 〈A, ∗, 1〉 is a commutative monoid.
3. (∗,⇒) forms a residuated pair with respect to ≤, that is: a ∗ b ≤ c iff b ≤ a⇒ c for all a, b, c ∈ A.
We say that a CIRL is three-potent1 when a2 ≤ a3 for all a ∈ A (in which case it follows that a2 = a3). If the lattice
ordering ofA also has 0 as a minimum element, thenA is a commutative integral bounded residuated lattice (CIBRL).
Setting ¬a := a⇒ 0, we then say that a CIBRL is involutivewhen it satisfies the equation ¬¬x ≈ x [17, p. 186]. The
latter last equation implies that x⇒ y ≈ ¬y ⇒ ¬x [26, Lemma 3.1].
The property of integrality mentioned in the above definition corresponds to the requirement that 1 be at the same time
the neutral element of the monoid and the top element of the lattice order. One easily sees that integrality entails that
the operation ∗ is ≤-decreasing (a ∗ b ≤ a) and that the term x ⇒ x defines thus an algebraic constant in the lattice
which is interpreted as 1.
Definition 5. An S ′-algebra is a three-potent involutive CIBRL.
Since CIBRLs form an equational class [16, Theorem 2.7], it is clear that S ′-algebras are also an equational class.
By contrast, from Definition 3 it is far from obvious whether S-algebras are equationally axiomatizable or not. By
Proposition 1, though, we immediately obtain the following result:
Proposition 2. Let A := 〈A,∧,∨,⇒,¬, 0, 1〉 be an S-algebra. Setting x ∗ y := ¬(x ⇒ ¬y), we have that A′ :=
〈A,∧,∨, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is an S ′-algebra.
The next lemma will allow us to verify that, conversely, every S ′-algebra has a term-definable S-algebra structure.
Thus, as anticipated, S ′-algebras and S-algebras can be viewed as two presentations (in slightly different languages) of
the same class of abstract structures. To establish this we shall check that every S ′-algebra satisfies all (quasi)equations
introduced in Definition 3.
Lemma 1 ([22], Lemma 1). 1. Any CIRL satisfies the equation (x ∨ y) ∗ z ≈ (x ∗ z) ∨ (y ∗ z).
2. Any CIRL satisfies x2 ∨ y2 ≈ (x2 ∨ y2)2.
3. Any three-potent CIRL satisfies (x ∨ y2)2 ≈ (x ∨ y)2.
4. Any three-potent CIRL satisfies (x ∨ y)2 ≈ x2 ∨ y2.
Proposition 3. Let A′ := 〈A,∧,∨, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 be an S ′-algebra. Setting ¬x := x ⇒ 0, we have that A :=
〈A,∧,∨,⇒,¬, 0, 1〉 is an S-algebra.
Proof. LetA′ be an S ′-algebra. We first consider the equations obtained fromDefinition 3.1. To check E(A1) (namely,
the equation x ⇒ x ≈ 1) one may use residuation and the facts that 1 ∗ a ≤ a and that 1 is the maximum element.
E(A2) follows from the fact that 0 is the minimum element of A′. E(A3) follows from the definition of ¬ in S ′ and
from E(A1). E(A4) follows from the fact that 1 ≈ 1 ⇒ 1. E(A5) follows from the fact that A′ is involutive. We look
next at the quasiequations obtained from Definition 3.3:
Q(P) follows from the commutativity of ∗ and from the equation (a ∗ b)⇒ c ≈ a⇒ (b⇒ c).
Q(C) follows from 3-potency: since a2 ≤ a3, we have that a3 ⇒ b ≈ 1 implies a2 ⇒ b ≈ 1.
Q(E) follows from the fact that A′ carries a partial order≤ that is determined by the implication⇒.
To prove Q(⇒ l), suppose a ≤ b and c ≤ d. From c ≤ d, as b ⇒ c ≤ b ⇒ c, using residuation we have that
b ∗ (b ⇒ c) ≤ c, thus b ∗ (b ⇒ c) ≤ d and therefore b ⇒ c ≤ b ⇒ d. As a ≤ b, using residuation and the
1The reader should be advised, however, that for some authors, for example [16, p. 96], three-potency corresponds to the
equation x3 ≈ x4 and two-potency to x2 ≈ x3.
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≤-monotonicity of ∗ we have that a∗ (b⇒ d) ≤ b∗ (b⇒ d) ≤ d, therefore b⇒ d ≤ a⇒ d and thus b⇒ c ≤ a⇒ d.
Now, since b⇒ c ≤ a⇒ d iff a ∗ (b⇒ c) ≤ d iff a ≤ (b⇒ c)⇒ d, we obtain the desired result.
For Q(⇒ r) we need to prove that if d ≈ 1, then b⇒ d ≈ 1. By residuation, recall that 1 ≤ b⇒ d iff 1 ∗ b ≤ d. The
latter equation is however obviously true, given that d ≈ 1.
The quasiequations Q(∧l1), Q(∧l2), Q(∧r), Q(∨l1), Q(∨r1) and Q(∨r2) follow straightforwardly from the fact
thatA′ is partially ordered and the order is determined by the implication.
To proveQ(∨l2), notice that (b∨ c)2 ≤ b2 ∨ c2 by Lemma 1.4. Suppose b2 ≤ d and c2 ≤ d, then sinceA′ is a lattice,
we have b2 ∨ c2 ≤ d and we conclude that (b ∨ c)2 ≤ d and thus (b ∨ c)2 ⇒ d ≈ 1.
As to Q(¬⇒l), by E(A1) we know that b ⇒ b ≈ 1, therefore we have b ∗ c ≤ b and b ∗ c ≤ c. Thus b ∗ c ≤ b ∧ c.
Now, if b ∧ c ≤ d, then b ∗ c ≤ d.
To prove Q(¬⇒r), suppose d2 ≤ b ∧ c. Using the ≤-monotonicity of ∗, we have d2 ∗ d2 ≤ (b ∧ c) ∗ (b ∧ c), i.e.,
d4 ≤ (b∧c)2. Using 3-potency, we have d4 ≈ d2, therefore d2 ≤ (b∧c)2. Since (b∧c)2 ≤ b∗ c, we have d2 ≤ (b∗ c).
Q(¬∧l), Q(¬∧r), Q(¬∨l) and Q(¬∨l) follow from the De Morgan’s Laws [16, Lemma 3.17]. Finally, we have
Q(¬¬l) and Q(¬¬r) becauseA′ is involutive.
It remains to prove the quasiequation according to which (a ⇒ b) ≈ 1 and (b ⇒ a) ≈ 1 imply a ≈ b. We have that
a ≤ b and b ≤ a; since ≤ is anti-symmetric it follows that a ≈ b.
From Propositions 2 and 3 above we obtain the desired result:
Theorem 2. The classes of S-algebras and of S ′-algebras are term-equivalent2.
In the next section we are going to use the algebraic insight gained through Theorem 2 to provide an alternative and
more perspicuous axiomatization of S.
4 A finite Hilbert-style calculus for S
We are now going to introduce a finite Hilbert-style calculus and prove that it is algebraizable with respect to the class
of S ′-algebras (hence, with respect to S-algebras). This will give us a finite presentation of S that is equivalent to
Nelson’s calculus of Section 2, but with the added advantage of involving only a finite number of axiom schemata.
Our calculus is an axiomatic strengthening of the full Lambek calculus with exchange and weakening (FLew; see
e.g. [27]), which will allow us to obtain the algebraizability of S as an easy extension of the corresponding result
about FLew .
The calculus S ′
Definition 6. The logic S ′ := 〈Fm,⊢S′〉 is the sentential logic in the language 〈∧,∨, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 of type
〈2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0〉 defined by the Hilbert-style calculus with the following axiom schemata and modus ponens as its
only rule schema:
(S1) (ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ ((ψ ⇒ γ)⇒ (ϕ⇒ γ))
(S2) (ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ γ))⇒ (ψ ⇒ (ϕ⇒ γ))
(S3) ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ ϕ)
(S4) ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ (ϕ ∗ ψ))
(S5) (ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ γ))⇒ ((ϕ ∗ ψ)⇒ γ)
(S6) (ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ ϕ
(S7) (ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ ψ
2We refer the reader to [37, p. 329] for a formal definition of term-equivalence. Informally, Theorem 2 is saying that S-algebras
and S ′-algebras may be seen as two equivalent presentations of the ‘same’ class of algebras in different algebraic languages,
analogous to the well-known presentation of Boolean algebras as Boolean rings or to that ofMV -algebras as certain lattice-ordered
groups.
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(S8) (ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ ((ϕ⇒ γ)⇒ (ϕ⇒ (ψ ∧ γ)))
(S9) ϕ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(S10) ψ ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(S11) (ϕ⇒ γ)⇒ ((ψ ⇒ γ)⇒ ((ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒ γ))
(S12) 1
(S13) 0⇒ ϕ
(S14) ((ϕ⇒ 0)⇒ 0)⇒ ϕ
(S15) (ϕ⇒ (ϕ⇒ (ϕ⇒ ψ)))⇒ (ϕ⇒ (ϕ⇒ ψ))
Axioms from (S1) to (S13) are those that axiomatize FLew as presented in
[38, Section 5], where FLew is proven to be algebraizable. From that result we can immediately obtain the
following:
Theorem 3. The calculus S ′ is algebraizable with the same defining equation and equivalence formulas as S (cf. The-
orem 1). Its equivalent algebraic semantics is the class of S ′-algebras.
Proof. We know from [38, Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3] that FLew is algebraizable with respect to the class of CIBRLs.
Given that S ′ is an axiomatic strengthening of FLew, by [15, Proposition 3.31], it is also algebraizable with the
same defining equation and equivalence formulas. The corresponding class of algebras is a subvariety of the class of
CIBRLs, and it can be axiomatized by adding equations corresponding to the new axioms, as described in Def. 3.1. It
is easy to check that these imply precisely that the equivalent algebraic semantics of S ′ is the class of all involutive
(S14) and three-potent (S15) CIBRLs, i.e., the class of S ′-algebras.
Although the logics S and S ′ were initially defined over different propositional languages (namely 〈∧,∨,⇒,¬, 0〉 for
S and 〈∧,∨,⇒, ∗,¬, 0, 1〉 for S ′), we can obviously expand the language of S to include the connectives 1 and ∗
defined by 1 := ¬0 and φ ∗ ψ := ¬(φ⇒ ¬ψ). This allows us to state the following:
Corollary 1. The calculi S (in the above-defined expanded language) and S ′ define the same consequence relation.
Proof. The result follows straightforwardly from the fact that S and S ′ are algebraizable (with the same defining
equation and equivalence formulas) with respect to the same class of algebras. To add some detail one can invoke the
algorithm of [15, Proposition 3.47], which allows one to obtain an axiomatization of an algebraizable logic from a
presentation of the corresponding class K that comprises its equivalent algebraic semantics; notice that the algorithm
uses only the (quasi)equations that axiomatize K and the defining equations and equivalence formulas witnessing
algebraizability.
We close the section with a non-trivial result about S that would also not have been easily established if one had to
work with Nelson’s original presentation. It is well known that substructural logics enjoy a generalized version of
the Deduction-Detachment Theorem [16, Theorem 2.14]. Combining this result with the algebraic insight obtained in
Subsection 3.2 allows us to obtain a ‘global’ deduction theorem for S:
Theorem 4 (Deduction-Detachment Theorem). For all Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ Fm, Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊢S ψ if and only if Γ ⊢S ϕ2 ⇒ ψ.
Proof. From [16, Corollary 2.15] we have that Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ψ iff Γ ⊢ ϕn ⇒ ψ for some n. Now it is easy to see that
in S, thanks to (S15), we can always choose n = 2.
Theorem 4 suggests that, upon defining ϕ → ψ := ϕ2 ⇒ ψ, one may obtain in S a new implication-type connective
→ that enjoys the standard formulation of the Deduction-Detachment Theorem (for which n = 1). This is precisely
what happens in Nelson’s logicN3, where in fact→ is usually taken as the primitive implication and⇒ as defined (see
Subsection 6.2). Whether a similar interdefinability result holds for S as well is actually an interesting open question,
to which we shall return in Section 8. For now, what we can say is that the above-defined term→ does indeed behave
on S-algebras like an implication operation, at least in the abstract sense introduced by Blok, Köhler and Pigozzi [5].
The latter paper is the second of a series devoted to classes of algebras of non-classical logics [10, Definition II.9.3],
focusing in particular on varieties that enjoy the property of having equationally definable principal congruences, or
EDPC for short [5, p. 338]. This is quite a strong property; in particular, it implies congruence-distributivity and the
congruence extension property [6, Theorem 1.2]. It is well known that a logic that is algebraizable with respect to
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some variety of algebras enjoys a (generalized) Deduction-Detachment Theorem3 if and only if its associated variety
has EDPC [15, Corollary 3.86]. This applies, in particular, to our logic S and to S-algebras.
In the context of varieties of non-classical logic having EDPC, the authors of [5] single out those that possess term-
definable operations that can be viewed as generalizations of intuitionistic conjunction, implication and bi-implication.
These operations are called, respectively, weak meet, weak relative pseudo-complementation and Gödel equivalence.
Algebras containing such operations are called weak Brouwerian semilattices with filter-preserving operations, or
WBSO for short [5, Definition 2.1].
According to [1], a variety having a constant 1 is called subtractive if the congruences of any algebra in the variety
permute at 1. SubtractiveWBSO varieties are particularly interesting because the lattice of congruences of any algebra
A belonging to a subtractive WBSO variety is isomorphic to the ideal lattice of A, for a certain uniformly-defined
notion of ideal. As observed in [5, p. 358], the algebraic counterpart of Nelson’s logic N3 is a WBSO variety. The
same is true for S-algebras; in fact, we can here prove a slightly stronger result:
Theorem 5. S-algebras form a WBSO variety in which a weak meet is given by ∧ (or, equivalently, by ∗), weak
relative pseudo-complementation is given by the term x2 ⇒ y and Gödel equivalence is x ⇔ y. In fact, S-algebras
form a subtractive WBSO variety.
Proof. One could directly check that, with the above choice of terms, S-algebras satisfy all properties of [5, Definition
2.1]. But we can provide a more compact proof as follows. As mentioned earlier, since the logic S has a form of
Deduction-Detachment Theorem (our Theorem 4), we know that the variety of S-algebras has EDPC [15, Corollary
3.86]. We can then apply [36, Theorem 3.3] (note that S-algebras satisfy the premisses of the theorem thanks to [36,
Lemma 3.2]) to conclude that (x ⇔ y)2 ∗ z is a ternary deductive term for S-algebras in the sense of [8, Definition
2.1] that is moreover regular with respect to 1 [8, Definition 4.1]. Then, by [8, Theorem 4.4], we have that S-algebras
form a WBSO variety. Finally, to check that S-algebras are subtractive [1, p. 214], it is sufficient to note that they
satisfy the equation 12 ⇒ x ≈ x [1, p. 215].
Regarding the proof of the preceding theorem, it may be interesting to note that applying [8, Theorem 4.4] to the
ternary deductive term (x ⇔ y)2 ∗ z would give us different witnessing terms: namely, we would obtain x2 ∗ y as
weak meet, (x2 ⇒ (x2 ∗ y))2 as weak relative pseudo-complementation and (x ⇔ y)2 as Gödel equivalence. This is
not surprising, for such terms need not be unique.
5 More on S-algebras
5.1 A non-distributive S-algebra
We are now going to look at a particular S-algebra that provides a counter-example for several formulas of S that are
not valid, including the formulas which Nelson claims (without proof) not to be provable in his calculus [24, p. 213].
1
a
c b
¬b ¬c
¬a
0
Figure 1: A8
3See e.g. [15, Definition 3.76] for a precise definition of generalized Deduction-Detachment Theorem.
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Example 1. The algebraA8 shown in Figure 1 is an S-algebra whose lattice reduct is obviously not distributive. The
table for the implication⇒ of A8 is shown below.
⇒ 0 1 c ¬c ¬b b a ¬a
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 c ¬c ¬b b a ¬a
c ¬c 1 1 b a b 1 b
¬c c 1 c 1 c 1 1 c
¬b b 1 1 b 1 b 1 b
b ¬b 1 c a c 1 1 c
a ¬a 1 c b c b 1 ¬a
¬a a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
In Figure 1, we consider that ¬1 = 0 and that ¬¬x = x, for each x ∈ A8. The above sound model of S ′ was found by
using the Mace4 Model Searcher [20]. We are going to check that A8 witnesses the failure of all the formulas listed
below:
Proposition 4. The following formulas cannot be proved in S.
1. p ∨ ¬p (Excluded Middle)
2. ¬(p ∧ ¬p)
3. (p ∧ ¬p)⇒ q (Ex Contradictione)
4. (p⇒ (p⇒ q))⇒ (p⇒ q) (Contraction)
5. (p⇒ (q ⇒ r))⇒ ((p ∧ q)⇒ r)
6. (p ∧ ¬q)⇒ ¬(p⇒ q)
7. ((p⇒ q)⇒ q)⇒ ((q ⇒ p)⇒ p) (Łukasiewicz)
8. (p ∧ (q ∨ r))⇒ ((p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r)) (Distributivity)
9. ((p2 ⇒ q) ∧ ((¬q)2 ⇒ ¬p))⇒ (p⇒ q) (Nelson)
Proof. Thanks to [15, Lemma 2.6], if φ can be proved in S, then ν(φ) = ν(φ → φ). As ν(φ → φ) = 1, it suffices to
find, for each of the above formulas, some valuation ν : Fm→ A8 such that ν(φ) 6= 1.
1. Setting ν(p) = c, we have ν(p ∨ ¬p) = ν(p) ∨ ¬ν(p) = c ∨ ¬c = a.
2. Setting ν(p) = c, we have ν(¬(p ∧ ¬p)) = ¬(c ∧ ¬c) = ¬(¬a) = a.
3. Let ν(p) = c and ν(q) = 0. Then ν((p ∧ ¬p)⇒ q) = ¬a⇒ 0 = a.
4. Let ν(p) = c and ν(q) = 0. Then ν((p ⇒ (p ⇒ q)) ⇒ (p ⇒ q)) = (c ⇒ (c ⇒ 0)) ⇒ (c ⇒ 0) = (c ⇒ ¬c) ⇒
¬c = b⇒ ¬c = a.
5. Let ν(p) = ν(q) = c and ν(r) = 0, then ν((p ⇒ (q ⇒ r)) ⇒ ((p ∧ q) ⇒ r)) = (c ⇒ (c ⇒ 0)) ⇒ ((c ∧ c) ⇒
0) = b⇒ (c⇒ 0) = b⇒ ¬c = a.
6. Let ν(p) = ν(q) = c, then ν((p ∧ ¬q)⇒ ¬(p⇒ q)) = (c ∧ ¬c)⇒ ¬(c⇒ c) = ¬a⇒ ¬1 = a.
7. Let ν(p) = ¬c and ν(q) = c. We have ν(((p⇒ q)⇒ q)⇒ ((q ⇒ p)⇒ p)) = ((¬c ⇒ c)⇒ c)⇒ ((c⇒ ¬c)⇒
¬c) = (c⇒ c)⇒ (b⇒ ¬c) = 1⇒ a = a.
8. Let ν(p) = c, ν(q) = ¬c and ν(r) = ¬b. We have ν((p ∧ (q ∨ r)) ⇒ ((p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r))) = ((c ∧ (¬c ∨ ¬b))
⇒ ((c ∧ ¬c) ∨ (c ∧ ¬b)) = (c ∧ a)⇒ (¬a ∨ ¬b) = c⇒ ¬b = a.
9. Let ν(p) = c and ν(q) = ¬b. We have ν(((p2 ⇒ q) ∧ ((¬q)2 ⇒ ¬p)) ⇒ (p ⇒ q)) = (¬(c ⇒ ¬c)) ⇒
¬b) ∧ ((¬(b⇒ ¬b))⇒ ¬c)⇒ (c⇒ ¬b) = (¬b⇒ ¬b) ∧ (¬c⇒ ¬c)⇒ a = 1⇒ a = a.
If we were to add the (Łukasiewicz) formula from Proposition 4 as a new axiom schema to S (or S ′), we would obtain
precisely the three-valued Łukasiewicz logic [13, Chapter 4.1]. No other non-classical logic in the Łukasiewicz family
is comparable with S because, on the one hand, they all lack three-potency, and, on the other, S does not satisfy
(Łukasiewicz), which is valid in all of them.
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5.2 The Galatos-Raftery doubling construction
We present here an adaptation of the construction introduced in [17, Section 6] to embed a commutative integral
residuated lattice into one having an involutive negation. This will provide us with a simple recipe for constructing
S-algebras, and will also prove useful in studying the relation between subclasses of residuated lattices and subclasses
of S-algebras (see Section 7).
Definition 7. Given a CIRL A := 〈A,∧,∨, ∗,⇒, 1〉, let ¬A := {¬a : a ∈ A} be a disjoint copy of A, and let
A∗ := A ∪ ¬A. We extend the lattice order of A to A∗ as follows. For all a, b ∈ A:
1. a ≤A∗ b iff a ≤A b.
2. ¬a ≤A∗ b.
3. ¬a ≤A∗ ¬b iff b ≤A a.
For each a ∈ A, we define ¬(¬a) := a. The behavior of the lattice operations is fixed according to De Morgan’s laws:
¬a ∧ ¬b := ¬(a ∨ b) and ¬a ∨ ¬b := ¬(a ∧ b). The operations ∗ and⇒ are extended to A∗ as follows:
a ∗ ¬b := ¬(a⇒ b) ¬a ∗ ¬b := ¬1
a⇒ ¬b := ¬(a ∗ b) ¬a⇒ ¬b := b⇒ a ¬a⇒ b := 1
It is shown in [17, Section 6] that, if A is a CIRL, then A∗ is an involutive CIBRL into which A is embedded in the
obvious way. Moreover, we have the following:
Proposition 5. A∗ is an S-algebra if and only if A is a three-potent CIRL.
Proof. One direction is immediate: if A∗ is an S-algebra, then it is three-potent, hence so is A as a {∧,∨, ∗,⇒, 1}-
subalgebra of A∗. Conversely, if A is a three-potent CIRL, since we already know that A∗ is a CIBRL, it remains to
show that a2 ≤ a3 for all a ∈ A∗. For a ∈ A the result follows from 3-potency ofA. If a ∈ ¬A, then by Definition 7
we have a2 = ¬1 = a3.
The following corollary concerns implicative lattices, namely, CIRLs where (∧,⇒) forms a residuated pair, and hence
∧ and ∗ coincide. Implicative lattices are precisely the 0-free subreducts of Heyting algebras.
Corollary 2. If A is either an implicative lattice or an S-algebra, then A∗ is an S-algebra.
In fact, it is not difficult to check that if A is an implicative lattice, then A∗ is a special S-algebra known as an
N3-lattice (we shall deal with these structures in Section 6.2).
Example 2. Consider the three-element linearly ordered MV -algebra [13, Definition 1.1.1], that we shall call Ł3
(for Łukasiewicz three-valued logic), defined as follows. The universe is {0, 1
2
, 1} with the obvious lattice ordering.
We consider Ł3 in the algebraic language 〈∧,∨, ∗,⇒,¬, 0, 1〉 with the (non-lattice) operations being given by the
following tables:
⇒ 0 1
2
1
0 1 1 1
1
2
1
2
1 1
1 0 1
2
1
∗ 0 1
2
1
0 0 0 0
1
2
0 0 1
2
1 0 1
2
1
¬
0 1
1
2
1
2
1 0
We note that Ł3 is an involutive CIBRL (see, e.g., [13, Lemma 1.1.4 and Proposition 1.1.5]). It is also easy to check
that Ł3 is three-potent, and so it is an S-algebra.
Applying the doubling construction to Ł3 we obtain the six-element linearly ordered S-algebra (Ł3)∗ with universe
{¬1,¬1
2
,¬0, 0, 1
2
, 1}. The lattice operations are determined in the obvious way and the implication is given by the
table below.
⇒ ¬1 ¬1
2
¬0 0 1
2
1
¬1 1 1 1 1 1 1
¬1
2
1
2
1 1 1 1 1
¬0 0 1
2
1 1 1 1
0 ¬0 ¬0 ¬0 1 1 1
1
2
¬1
2
¬0 ¬0 1
2
1 1
1 ¬1 ¬1
2
¬0 0 1
2
1
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(Ł3)∗ is an example of an S-algebra which is distributive but fails to satisfy the equation corresponding to Nelson
axiom from Proposition 4.9. Setting ν(p) := ¬0 and ν(q) := ¬1
2
, we have (((¬0)2 ⇒ ¬1
2
) ∧ ((¬¬1
2
)2 ⇒ ¬¬0)) ⇒
(¬0⇒ ¬1
2
) = ((¬1⇒ ¬1
2
) ∧ (0⇒ 0))⇒ 1
2
= (1 ∧ 1)⇒ 1
2
= 1
2
.
6 N 3 and N 4
As mentioned earlier, David Nelson is remembered for having introduced, besides S, two better-known logics: N3,
which is usually called just Nelson logic [23], and N4 which is known as paraconsistent Nelson logic [4]. Both
logics are algebraizable with respect to classes of residuated structures (called, respectively, N3-lattices or Nelson
algebras, andN4-lattices). The question then arises of what is precisely the relation between S and these other logics,
or equivalently between S-algebras, N3-lattices and N4-lattices. Can we meaningfully say that one is stronger than
the other? By looking at their algebraic models, it will not be difficult to show that N3 (which is known to be an
axiomatic strengthening ofN4) can also be viewed as an axiomatic strengthening of S, while N4 and S do not seem
to be comparable in any meaningful way. Just to fix terminology for what follows, we shall say that a logic L′ is a
conservative expansion of a logic L when the language of L′ expands that of L and yet the consequence relations of
both logics coincide on the common formulas.
6.1 N4
Definition 8. N4 := 〈Fm,⊢N4〉 is the sentential logic in the language 〈∧,∨,→,¬〉 of type 〈2, 2, 2, 1〉 defined by the
Hilbert-style calculus with the following axiom schemata and modus ponens as its only rule schema:
(N1) φ→ (ψ → φ)
(N2) (φ→ (ψ → γ))→ ((φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ γ))
(N3) (φ ∧ ψ)→ φ
(N4) (φ ∧ ψ)→ ψ
(N5) (φ→ ψ)→ ((φ→ γ)→ (φ→ (ψ ∧ γ)))
(N6) φ→ (φ ∨ ψ)
(N7) ψ → (φ ∨ ψ)
(N8) (φ→ γ)→ ((ψ → γ)→ ((φ ∨ ψ)→ γ))
(N9) ¬¬φ↔ φ
(N10) ¬(φ ∨ ψ)↔ (¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
(N11) ¬(φ ∧ ψ)↔ (¬φ ∨ ¬ψ)
(N12) ¬(φ→ ψ)↔ (φ ∧ ¬ψ)
Here φ ↔ ψ abbreviates (φ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ). The implication → in N4 is usually called weak implication, in
contrast to the strong implication⇒ that is defined by the following term:
φ⇒ ψ := (φ→ ψ) ∧ (¬ψ → ¬φ).
As the notation suggests, it is the strong implication, not the weak one, that we shall compare with the implication
of S. This appears indeed to be the more meaningful choice, as explained below.
A remarkable feature of the weak implication of N4 is that, on the one hand (unlike the implication of S), it enjoys
the Deduction-Detachment Theorem in its standard formulation: Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢N4 ψ if and only if Γ ⊢N4 ϕ → ψ. On
the other hand, contraposition fails (ϕ → ψ 6⊢N4 ¬ψ → ¬ϕ), and the corresponding ‘weak bi-implication’ (again
unlike S, as axiom (A5) in Definition 1 makes clear) does not satisfy the following congruence property: ⊢N4 ϕ↔ ψ
need not imply ⊢N4 ¬ϕ↔ ¬ψ. By contrast, the strong implication ofN4 does not enjoy the Deduction-Detachment
Theorem but (like the implication of S) it satisfies contraposition, and the associated bi-implication (φ⇒ ψ)∧(ψ ⇒ φ)
enjoys the congruence property. The same considerations apply to the logicN3 considered in the next subsection.
It is well known [31, Theorem 2.6] that N4 is algebraizable (though not implicative) with defining equation E(φ) :=
{φ ≈ φ → φ} and equivalence formulas ∆(φ, ψ) := {φ ⇒ ψ, ψ ⇒ φ}. The implication in E(φ) could as well be
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taken to be the strong one, so E(φ) := {φ ≈ φ⇒ φ} would work too. By contrast, letting∆(φ, ψ) := {φ→ ψ, ψ →
φ} or the equivalent ∆(φ, ψ) := {φ ↔ ψ} would not work precisely because of the failure of the above-mentioned
congruence property.
The equivalent algebraic semantics ofN4 is the class ofN4-lattices defined below [25, Definition 8.4.1]:
Definition 9. An algebra A := 〈A,∨,∧,→,¬〉 of type of type 〈2, 2, 2, 1〉 is an N4-lattice if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. 〈A,∨,∧,¬〉 is a De Morgan lattice.
2. The relation  defined for all a, b ∈ A by a  b iff (a→ b)→ (a→ b) = a→ b is a pre-order on A.
3. The relation ≡ defined for all a, b ∈ A as a ≡ b iff a  b and b  a is compatible with ∧,∨,→ and the
quotient A⊲⊳ := 〈A,∨,∧,→〉/≡ is an implicative lattice.
4. For all a, b ∈ A, ¬(a→ b) ≡ a ∧ ¬b.
5. For all a, b ∈ A, a ≤ b iff a  b and ¬b  ¬a, where ≤ is the lattice order of A.
Despite this somewhat exotic definition, the class of N4-lattices can actually be axiomatized by equations only [25,
Definition 8.5.1].
A simple example of an N4-lattice is A4, shown in Figure 2, whose lattice reduct is the four-element De Morgan
algebra.
1
n b
0
Figure 2: A4
The tables for weak implication and negation inA4 are as follows:
→ 0 n b 1
0 1 1 1 1
n 1 1 1 1
b 0 n b 1
1 0 n b 1
¬
0 1
n n
b b
1 0
One can check that A4 satisfies all properties of Definition 9, the quotient A4/≡ mentioned in Definition 9.3 being
the two-element Boolean algebra. It is also not difficult to see that no constant term is definable in A4. In fact,
since the singleton {b} is a subuniverse ofA4, this element would be the only possible interpretation for an algebraic
constant. But {0, 1} is also a subuniverse of A4, so b cannot be the algebraic constant. This implies that A4 has no
term-definable S-algebra structure, and that no constant term exists in the whole class of N4-lattices. In particular,
neither the equation x→ x ≈ y → y nor x⇒ x ≈ y ⇒ y hold in all N4-lattices.
In order to compareN4 and S we must fix a common propositional language, an obvious choice being 〈∧,∨,→,¬〉,
which is the primitive language of N4 as introduced above. That is, we interpret the implication of S (up to now
denoted⇒) as the weak implication→ of N4. Under this interpretation, it is easy to check that for instance the N4
axiom (N12) is not provable in S (Proposition 4.6). On the other hand, it is well known that the weak implication of
N4 does not satisfy the contraposition axiom (A5) of our Definition 1: (φ → ψ) ↔ (¬ψ → ¬φ). Thus we must
conclude that, over this language,N4 and S are incomparable.
As mentioned earlier, another possible choice for a common language would be one that replaces→ by⇒, interpreting
the original implication of S as the strong implication⇒ ofN4. This is also a sensible option, for it has been recently
shown [39] that the whole logic N4 can be equivalently presented in this language: the weak implication is term-
definable in the 〈∧,∨,⇒,¬〉-fragment of N4 (namely, by setting φ → ψ := φ ∧ (((φ ∧ (ψ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ ψ) ⇒
((φ ∧ (ψ ⇒ ψ))⇒ ψ)))⇒ ((φ ∧ (ψ ⇒ ψ))⇒ ψ), see [39, Theorem 2.1]).
Under the latter interpretation, the above-mentioned contraposition axiom turns out to be valid in both logics. However,
the fact that the equation x⇒ x ≈ y ⇒ y does not hold in allN4-lattices implies (via the algebraizability ofN4) that
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the formula (φ ⇒ φ) ⇒ (ψ ⇒ ψ), which is valid in S, is not provable in N4. On the other hand, the Distributivity
axiom is valid in N4 but not in S, as we have seen (Proposition 4.8). All the above arguments continue to hold also if
we were to consider conservative expansions ofN4 such as the logicN4⊥ of [25].
Taking into account the above observations, we conclude the following.
Proposition 6. N4 (together with all of its conservative expansions) and S are incomparable over either language
〈∧,∨,→,¬〉 or 〈∧,∨,⇒,¬〉.
In the next section we are going to see that at least in the case of the logic N3 the second choice of language allows
us to show that the two logics are indeed comparable, with S being the deductively weaker among them.
6.2 N3
Nelson’s logicN3 := 〈Fm,⊢N3〉 is the axiomatic strengthening ofN4 obtained by adding the following axiom:
(N13) ¬φ→ (φ→ ψ)
As an axiomatic strengthening of N4, we have that N3 is also algebraizable with the same defining equation and
equivalence formulas. N3 is in fact implicative, and its equivalent algebraic semantics is the variety of N3-lattices,
which are just N4-lattices satisfying the equation corresponding to the above axiom (namely, ¬x→ (x→ y) ≈ x→
x) or, equivalently, x → x ≈ y → y (which forces integrality). The latter equation implies that each N3-lattice has
two algebraic constants, given by 1 := x→ x and 0 := ¬1.
In his 1959 paper [24, p. 215], Nelson mentioned that a calculus forN3 (there denoted byN ) could be obtained from
his calculus for S by removing certain rules and adding others, thus leaving it unclear whether one logic could be
viewed as a strengthening of the other. Our algebraizability result for S gives us a way to settle this issue.
As in the preceding subsection, we may compare S and N3 over the languages 〈∧,∨,→,¬, 0, 1〉 and 〈∧,∨,⇒
,¬, 0, 1〉, this time including the propositional constants which are term-definable in both logics. The first option
yields no new results, for the arguments of the preceding subsection continue to hold forN3 too. Thus, S andN3 are
also incomparable over 〈∧,∨,→,¬, 0, 1〉. The second option instead gives us the following.
Proposition 7. N3 is a (proper) strengthening of S over the language 〈∧,∨,⇒,¬, 0, 1〉.
Proof. It follows from [37, Theorem 3.12] that (the 〈∧,∨, ∗,⇒,¬, 0, 1〉-reduct of) every N3-lattice satisfies all prop-
erties of our Definition 5, and thus is an S-algebra. On the other hand, N3-lattices (like N4-lattices) are distributive,
while S-algebras need not be. Thus, invoking the algebraizability of N3 and of S once more, we have that N3 is a
proper strengthening of S.
Taking into account the axiomatization of N3 given in [37, p. 326], we can add further information to the preceding
proposition by saying that N3 can be viewed as the axiomatic strengthening of S obtained by adding the (Distributiv-
ity) and the (Nelson) axioms from Proposition 4. One can, in fact, do even better, showing that an S-algebra satisfying
the equation corresponding to the (Nelson) axiom must satisfy (Distributivity) as well [11, Remark 3.7]. Thus we
obtain the following.
Proposition 8. N3 over the language 〈∧,∨,⇒,¬, 0, 1〉 is the axiomatic strengthening of S by the (Nelson) axiom.
It is not difficult to verify (see Example 2) that adding (Distributivity) to S does not allow us to prove (Nelson).
Thus, if we do so, we obtain a distinct logic that is intermediate between S and N3. On the other hand, the weakest
strengthening of both S andN4 is the logicN3 itself. To see this, recall that S-algebras are integral residuated lattices,
and therefore satisfy the equation x ⇒ x ≈ y ⇒ y. Now, an N4-lattice satisfying such equation (i.e. an algebra that
is at the same time an N4-lattice and an S-algebra) must actually be an N3-lattice. This can be easily checked using
Odintsov’s twist-structure representation of N4-lattices [25, Proposition 8.4.3]. Thus, N3 is the join of S and N4 in
the lattice of all strengthenings of S.
Proposition 9. N3-lattices = S-algebras ∩ N4-lattices.
The following information on S-algebras is also obtained as a straightforward consequence of the previous results.
Proposition 10. The variety of S-algebras is not finitely generated.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that the variety of S-algebras was V (K), with K a finite set of finite algebras (see
[10, Definitions II.9.1 and II.9.4] for the meaning of the V,H and S operators). Since S-algebras are congruence-
distributive (this follows from [10, Theorem II.12.3] and also from our Theorem 5), we could apply Jónsson’s
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lemma [10, Corollary IV.6.10] to conclude that the subdirectly irreducible algebras of V (K) are in HS(K). Thus,
there would be only finitely many subdirectly irreducible S-algebras. However, it is well known that there are infinitely
many subdirectly irreducibleN3-lattices (see, e.g., [25, Corollary 9.2.11]), and so there are infinitely many subdirectly
irreducible S-algebras.
Concerning the relation between S-algebras and N3-lattices, we can employ the construction introduced in Defini-
tion 7 to state an analogue of Proposition 5.
Proposition 11. Let A∗ be an S-algebra constructed according to Definition 7. Then:
1. A∗ is an N3-lattice if and only if A is an implicative lattice.
2. A∗ is anMV -algebra ([13, Definition 1.1.1]) if and only if A is trivial (and hence, if and only if A∗ is the
two-element Boolean algebra).
Proof. 1. Assume A is an implicative lattice, and let us check that the Nelson equation ((x2 ⇒ y) ∧ ((¬y)2 ⇒
¬x)) ⇒ (x⇒ y) ≈ 1 holds in A∗. Let a, b ∈ A. Clearly, the only non-trivial cases are when either a or b are in ¬A.
Using the fact that a2 = a and b2 = b, we have ((a2 ⇒ ¬b) ∧ ((¬¬b)2 ⇒ ¬a)) ⇒ (a ⇒ ¬b) = ((a ⇒ ¬b) ∧ (b ⇒
¬a)) ⇒ (a ⇒ ¬b) = 1. In addition, given that ¬a ≤ b, we have (((¬a)2 ⇒ b) ∧ ((¬b)2 ⇒ ¬¬a)) ⇒ (¬a ⇒ b) =
(((¬a)2 ⇒ b) ∧ ((¬b)2 ⇒ a)) ⇒ 1 = 1. Lastly, we have (((¬a)2 ⇒ ¬b) ∧ ((¬¬b)2 ⇒ ¬¬a)) ⇒ (¬a ⇒ ¬b) =
(((¬a)2 ⇒ ¬b) ∧ (b2 ⇒ a))⇒ (b⇒ a) = (((¬a)2 ⇒ ¬b) ∧ (b⇒ a))⇒ (b⇒ a) = 1.
Conversely, assume A∗ is an N3-lattice. Then, for all a ∈ A, we can show that a ⇒ a2 = 1 by instantiating the
equation corresponding to the Nelson axiom as follows: ((a2 ⇒ a2) ∧ ((¬(a2))2 ⇒ ¬a)) ⇒ (a ⇒ a2) = 1. Since
b2 = ¬1 for all b ∈ ¬A, ((a2 ⇒ a2) ∧ ((¬(a2))2 ⇒ ¬a)) ⇒ (a ⇒ a2) = (1 ∧ (¬1 ⇒ ¬a)) ⇒ (a ⇒ a2) = 1 ⇒
(a⇒ a2) = a⇒ a2, which implies the desired result. Thus a = a2, which implies thatA is an implicative lattice.
2. Assume A∗ is an MV -algebra. Then A∗ satisfies the so-called divisibility equation x ∗ (x ⇒ y) = x ∧ y [13,
Proposition 1.1.5]. Now let a ∈ A, so that ¬a <A∗ a. We have ¬a = a ∧ ¬a = a ∗ (a ⇒ ¬a) = a ∗ ¬(a ∗ a). But
a ∗ ¬a = ¬1 and so, by ≤-monotonicity, a ∗ ¬(a ∗ a) = ¬1. Thus, ¬a = ¬1, which implies that A = {1}.
The preceding proposition, besides characterizing the algebras of the formA∗ that happen to beN3-lattices, highlights
the fact that A∗ turns out to be an MV -algebra (or Heyting, or Boolean algebra) only in the degenerate case. For
the reader familiar with the twist-structure representation of N3-lattices [25, Proposition 8.4.3], it may be worth
mentioning that (as one can easily verify) when A∗ is an N3-lattice, the quotient algebra A∗⊲⊳ given by the twist-
structure representation (cf. Definition 9) is isomorphic to the ordinal sum of A with a one-element algebra (which
constitutes the bottom element ofA∗⊲⊳).
7 Strengthenings of S
In this section we take a brief look at the finitary4 strengthenings of S. As is usual in algebraic logic, we shall in
fact consider the equivalent question about subquasivarieties of S-algebras (on quasivarieties and quasiequations, see
e.g. [10, Definition V.2.24]). It is well known that finitary strengthenings of an algebraizable logic (in our case S)
form a lattice that is dually isomorphic to the lattice of subquasivarieties of its equivalent algebraic semantics — in
our case, S-algebras (see e.g. [15, Theorem 3.33]). Similarly, axiomatic strengthenings correspond to subvarieties [15,
Corollary 3.40].
By combining, for instance, [12, Corollary 5.3] with [16, Theorem 1.59], we know that there are continuum many
sub(quasi)varieties of N3-lattices, and from this it follows that there are at least continuum many subquasivarieties
of S-algebras. An interesting question is how many of these subquasivarieties are included between S-algebras and
N3-lattices. Using the doubling construction of Subsection 5.2 we can obtain some partial results in this direction.
Let {ei : i ∈ I} ∪ {e} ⊆ Fm× Fm be equations in the language of residuated lattices (which does not include the 0
constant). Let
q(~x) := &{ei : i ∈ I} =⇒ e
be a quasiequation where ~x are all the variables appearing in {ei : i ∈ I} ∪ {e}. Define the quasiequation
q∗(~x) := &({ei : i ∈ I} ∪ {¬x ⊑ x : x ∈ ~x}) =⇒ e
4 For the sake of simplicity we restrict our attention to finitary strengthenings, though all the considerations of the present section
generalize straightforwardly to arbitrary strengthenings (i.e., sub-generalized-quasivarieties).
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which is built with formulas Fm∗ in the language of S-algebras (which includes 0 and therefore the negation), where
x ⊑ y is a shorthand for the equation y ∨ x ≈ y. Notice that if q(~x) is an equation (i.e. the set {ei : i ∈ I} is empty),
then q∗(~x) is a quasiequation of the form:
&{¬x ⊑ x : x ∈ ~x}) =⇒ e
It is not difficult to see that such a quasiequation is equivalent, in the context of S-algebras, to the equation e∗ that is
obtained from e by substituting every variable x in e with the term x ∨ ¬x. In other words, if q(~x) is an equation in
the language of residuated lattices, then q∗(~x) is (equivalent to) an equation in the language of S-algebras.
Let A be a three-potent CIRL, and let A∗ be the bounded CIRL obtained as in Definition 7 (which is an S-algebra
by Proposition 5). Notice that within A∗ the elements of A are precisely the solutions to the equation x ≈ x ∨ ¬x
(abbreviated ¬x ⊑ x), that is, A = {a ∈ A∗ : ¬a ≤ a}.
Proposition 12. For any CIRL A and any quasiequation q(~x) in the language of residuated lattices,
A  q(~x) if and only if A∗  q∗(~x).
Proof. For the rightward direction, it is sufficient to notice that all elements in A∗ satisfying the premisses of q∗(~x)
must belong to A, so we can use q(~x) to obtain the desired result. As to the leftward direction, since any element
a ∈ A satisfies ¬a ≤ a, we can use q∗(~x) to show that q(~x) holds in A.
Let Q be a quasivariety of commutative, integral, 3-potent residuated lattices. Then {A∗ : A ∈ Q} is a class of S-
algebras by Proposition 5, and we can consider the quasivarietyQ∗ := Q({A∗ : A ∈ Q}) generated by this class (see
[15, Definition 1.72] for a definition of theQ operator). Q∗ is then a quasivariety of S-algebras, and from our previous
considerations we also know that if Q is a variety, then Q∗ is also a variety. Moreover, from Proposition 12 we have
the following result:
Proposition 13. For any quasivariety Q of CIRLs and any quasiequation q in the language of Q, we have Q  q if
and only if Q∗  q∗.
Denote byRL3 the variety of three-potent CIRLs, by T the trivial variety (in the language of residuated lattices), and
by [RL3, T ] the lattice of all subquasivarieties of RL3. Similarly, we denote by [(RL3)∗,BA] the interval (in the
lattice of all subquasivarieties of S-algebras) between (RL3)∗ := Q({A∗ : A ∈ RL3}) and the variety of Boolean
algebras BA. Notice that BA = (T )∗ by Proposition 11.2.
Proposition 14. The map (·)∗ is a lattice embedding of [RL3, T ] into [(RL3)∗,BA].
Proof. It is obvious that the map (.)∗ is order-preserving. We show that it is also order-reflecting, which implies that
it is injective. Let Q1, Q2 be quasivarieties of three-potent CIRLs. Assume (Q1)∗ ⊆ (Q2)∗, let A ∈ Q1 and suppose
q is any quasiequation such that Q2  q. Then, by Proposition 12, we have (Q2)∗  q∗. By definition we have
A∗ ∈ (Q1)∗ and therefore A∗ ∈ (Q2)∗, which means that A∗  q∗. Then again by Proposition 12 we have A  q,
which means that A ∈ Q2. Hence, Q1 ⊆ Q2 as required. Thus the map (.)∗ is an order embedding and therefore a
(complete) lattice embedding.
By our previous considerations, (RL3)∗ is a variety of S-algebras, and in fact it is not difficult to show that it is a
proper subvariety of S-algebras; it is proper because, e.g., the equation (x⇒ ¬x)∨ (¬x⇒ x) ≈ 1 is valid in (RL3)∗
but not in all S-algebras (the algebra A8 shown earlier being a witness). Similarly, denoting by IL the variety of
implicative lattices, we have by Proposition 11.1 that (IL)∗ is a proper subvariety ofN3-lattices.
By [16, Theorem 9.54], the cardinality of [RL3, T ] is greater than or equal to the continuum. By Proposition 14,
this implies that there are at least continuum many quasivarieties in [(RL3)∗,BA] ⊆ [S,BA]. It is not difficult to
see (e.g., by observing again that the equation (x ⇒ ¬x) ∨ (¬x ⇒ x) ≈ 1 need not be satisfied in all N3-lattices)
that [N3,BA] is not a sublattice of [(RL3)∗,BA], and this entails that we actually have now some more information
than when we started off. Similarly, denoting by κ the cardinality of [RL3, IL], we now know that the cardinality of
[(RL3)∗, (IL)∗], and therefore that of [S, (IL)∗], must be at least as large as κ. Unfortunately, as far as we know, the
cardinality of [RL3, IL] is at present unknown. This leaves us with an interesting open problem, namely the study of
the cardinality (and the structure) of the lattice of logics/algebras [S,N3]. We mention a few more open problems in
the next section.
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8 Future work
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the present paper — together with its precursor [22] — is the first devoted
to a semantical study of Nelson’s logic S. We have though but scratched the surface of what may turn out to be an
interesting topic for future research. We mention here but three directions.
The first is to study other types of calculi for S, for example sequent-style or display-style calculi; in particular one
would be interested in calculi that enjoy certain desirable properties (e.g., analytic, cut-free ones) and that fit well
within the general proof-theoretic framework of substructural logics. Encouraging results in this direction have been
obtained aboutN3, but at this point it seems far from obvious whether (or how) these may be extended to our S.
The second issue may be cast in purely algebraic terms. Thanks to recent work of M. Spinks and R. Veroff, we know
that N4-lattices as well as N3-lattices can be equivalently presented taking either the strong implication (⇒) or the
weak one (→) as primitive. In the case ofN4-lattices, this result turns out to be surprisingly hard to prove; not so hard
forN3-lattices, where the term defining the weak implication from the strong one is also simpler [37, Theorem 1.1.3],
viz. φ → ψ := φ ⇒ (φ ⇒ ψ). The same question can now be asked about S-algebras: Is it possible to axiomatize
them taking the weak implication as primitive? For this, one might start by checking which theorems of N3 and N4
regarding the weak implication are valid in all S-algebras, once we translate them according to the preceding term.
The answer seems at the moment far from obvious, and might provide us with further logical insight into S. It is
well known, for example, that the {∧,∨,→}-fragment of N4 (recall that here the implication → is the weak one)
coincides with the corresponding fragment of intuitionistic logic; which means thatN4 (andN3) may be regarded as
strengthenings of intuitionistic logic by an involutive DeMorgan negation. A solution to the above-mentioned problem
would then tell us whether an analogous result can be stated for the logic S as well.
Lastly, a promising line of research may be opened by the study of the Nelson axiom/equation (Proposition 4.9) in
a more abstract algebraic setting. It is not difficult to see that the Nelson equation is equivalent, in the context of S-
algebras, to the following condition:
a2 ⇒ b = 1 and (¬b)2 ⇒ ¬a = 1 imply a ≤ b.
One can also (less immediately) show that this is in turn equivalent to the following:
ϑ(b, 1) ⊆ ϑ(a, 1) and ϑ(a, 0) ⊆ ϑ(b, 0) imply a ≤ b (1)
where ϑ(a, 1) denotes the congruence generated by the set {a, 1} and so on. It is interesting to notice that the latter
condition is almost purely algebraic, for it only relies on the presence of two distinguished elements in the algebra
and (inessentially) of a partial order. Moreover, it closely reminds the properties of congruence orderability and
congruence quasi-orderability studied in [2, 3]. This suggests that a purely algebraic investigation of the Nelson
equation, restated as (1), along the lines of Aglianò’s work may be a fruitful one. The first results in this direction have
by now been published as [35, 32]. Further results are to be found in [33].
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